

23 March 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: C/PCD

FROM : SO/PCD

SUBJECT : Emergency Decontamination Center

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1. PROBLEM:

a. To evaluate the proposed sites, [redacted] and [redacted] to determine which site would be more advantageous for the establishment of an emergency decontamination center for the Central Intelligence Agency in the event of an atomic attack upon the city of Washington.

2. ASSUMPTIONS:

a. That all personnel and equipment entering the center are contaminated.

b. That personnel numbering approximately [redacted] will be processed through the center.

3. FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM:

a. To properly evaluate a site to be used as a decontamination center, it is desirable to investigate the nature of contamination, decontamination, personnel protection and the disposition of radioactive waste.

b. Radioactive contamination may be caused by the fission products formed in the detonation of an atomic bomb, by neutron-induced activity in soil and water and the deliberate use of specific radioisotopes, apart from their association with the bomb, as radiological warfare agents. The type of blast, whether an air-burst, an underwater burst or an underground burst, will also determine the extent to which an area will be contaminated. Therefore, the degree of radiation intensity to which individuals will be exposed depends upon the manner in which the contamination is propagated.

c. The feasibility of decontamination depends upon the importance of the equipment and the risk to personnel involved. If contamination is heavy, it is preferable to put aside the equipment whenever possible, allowing radioactivity to decay with time. When this is not possible or desirable, the most appropriate chemical or physical method should be employed. Contamination is largely a surface phenomenon and very often can be removed by simply scrubbing and washing with detergent and water. Where porous surfaces

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are involved, more stringent chemical or physical methods may be required. The actual decontamination process can be reduced to two steps; first, immediate emergency measures, and second, final operations of a thorough nature. Decontamination of contaminated personnel is, of course, a primary requirement.

d. In all decontamination procedures, adequate measures must be taken to protect the personnel comprising the decontamination teams from excessive radiation dosages. Personnel employed in this capacity should wear protective coveralls, gloves and boots. If there is danger of inhaling radioactive dusts, masks and goggles should be provided. Additional safeguards include film badges and pocket dosimeters.

e. In any decontamination procedure, radioactive waste products are obtained and constitute a disposal problem. These products may be solids, liquids or gases and provision must be made to prevent their further contaminating an area. Normal peacetime methods for disposal involve storing of the materials, allowing as much of the radioactive substance to decay as possible with subsequent burial of the material in a properly labeled area or with burial at sea. Gases constitute another sort of problem since storage and burial are not feasible. Most radioactive particles can be removed from gas by filtration with the release of the gas to the atmosphere. The filters are then contaminated and can be disposed of as solid waste. During a period of emergency, the restrictions placed upon disposal will naturally be relaxed, but whenever possible they should be obeyed.

#### 4. DISCUSSION:

a. With the foregoing brief discussion of contamination and decontamination in mind, an evaluation of the two available sites will be made incorporating five additional factors; transportation, manpower, security, medical and economy.

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c. In addition to the transportation problem, a force of at least eight engineers would be required to man the transportation vehicles, to unload and to erect eight tents, two of which are 16 x 32 feet, to install 16 shower units running at least 300 feet of pipe from a pond through wooded and possibly muddy terrain up a 20-foot grade to the selected shower site. The estimated time

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h. Control of contamination at [REDACTED] would not present a problem. There is sufficient ground immediately beyond the station gates for the parking of automobiles and at this vantage point, personal property, other than clothing, which may be contaminated can be removed. At a later time, automobiles could be brought on to the Station proper to a designated area for decontamination. All contaminated clothing can be sealed in metal barrels and disposed of by burial or can be decontaminated at a later date by repeated washings. To assure safety, periodic monitoring of the entire area in use could be performed along with regular analyses of food, soil and water. Such protective procedure would require a minimum of trained personnel. 25X1A6a

## 5. CONCLUSIONS:

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a. [REDACTED] would be a more advantageous site for the establishment of a decontamination center. Use of the facilities at [REDACTED] would save duplication in identifying personnel, would eliminate confusion at the [REDACTED], would conserve manpower and equipment and would eliminate the necessity of depending upon auxiliary equipment like gas pumps and generators without increasing the probability of contaminating the Station. 25X1A6a

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## 6. ACTION RECOMMENDED:

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a. After a careful study of the factors involved and after personally visiting each of the proposed sites, I would recommend that [REDACTED] be chosen as the permanent site for the Central Intelligence Agency's emergency decontamination center.

b. Provision should be made to permit changes in this recommendation whenever indicated by the availability of new atomic data.

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[REDACTED]

MO/ICM:nh (21 March '53)

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